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THE BUSH NLRB IN PERSPECTIVE:
DOES THE PLAYING FIELD NEED LEVELING?
Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr.It has been written and stated recently that now is the time to
"level the playing field" between management and labor in the labor
and employment law arena.' The effort to recast the balance has been
directed at the National Labor Relations Act2 ("NLRA" or the "Act")
and the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board").
If it chooses to do so, the Clinton Administration has a unique
opportunity to recast the Board by appointing, during its tenure, a
completely new Board and General Counsel. As of press time, three
positions on the Board, as well as the General Counsel's position are
currently vacant? Furthermore, Member Dennis Devaney's term will
expire in 1994 and Chairman James Stephens' will the following
year. The impact of these changes may be felt throughout the remaining three years of the Clinton Administration and the nation's major
labor law forum could well have a new philosophy and profile lasting
well beyond 1996.
Would a dramatic philosophical change at the Board be a wise
step for America and its economy? Is the playing field between management and labor now so uneven as to require balancing? Should we
expect our primary labor law forum to be more proactive? Should the
Board disregard or reinterpret prior law to fit its own philosophical
views?
These are some of the issues that will be addressed in the discussion that follows. However, in an effort to pique the reader's
curiosity, I shall approach these issues from a different dimension.
My intention is to analyze the major decisions of the 1990-1993
Board4 in an effort to determine whether the level playing field is in

* BA, Wesleyan University; LL.B., Cornell University; Member, National Labor
Relations Board, 1989-1993; Of Counsel, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Washington,
D.C.
1. Frank Swoboda, Panel to Study Overhaul of Labor Law; Administration Move Signals Increased Support to Unions, WAsH. PoST, Feb. 17, 1993, at F3 (quoting Robert B.

Reich, Secretary of Labor).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
3. President Clinton has nominated William B. Gould IV to be the next chairman of
the Board and Margaret Browning as another of the Board's members.
4. For the majority of this time, the Board consisted of only four members - Chair-
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fact uneven and what the possible impact may be if a major change
in the philosophy of the Board does occur.
Any study of this nature must commence with a study of the
Act itself. Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Ac reveals that
the drafters were clearly cognizant of the delicate balance between
management and labor that is necessary to sustain a healthy economy.
It states:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries.'
It continues:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some
labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or
the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such commerce through strikes
and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities
which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such
commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.7
The announced public policy, the cornerstone of the Act as
amended in 1947, is thus established to be:
" to eliminate obstructions to the free flow of commerce;
" to mitigate and eliminate those practices which have obstructed the
free flow of commerce by encouraging collective bargaining, and
also by protecting the right of all workers to freely associate, to
man James M. Stephens, Dennis M. Devaney, John N. Raudabaugh and myself. In 1991 the
Board lost the able services of former member Mary Cracraft, who failed to gain reappointment by President Bush. The Stephens, Devaney, Oviatt and Raudabaugh Board will be referred to herein as the "Bush Board" and it will include former Member Cracraft until she
left the Board on August 27, 1991.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).

6. Id.
7.

Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol11/iss1/2

2

Oviatt: The Bush NLRB in Perspective: Does the Playing Field Need Levelin
The Bush NLRB in Perspective

19931

organize and to select representatives for the purpose of negotiating
their wages, hours and conditions of employment.
The Board is empowered to prevent any "person" from committing an unfair labor practice (as described in Section 8 of the Act)
which affects commerce.9 Section 8 details various acts in which
employers and unions, both of which are. defined as "persons" in the
Act, are prohibited from engaging. 0
Likewise, in order to guarantee that employees have "the fullest
freedom" in exercising their rights which are guaranteed by the Act,
the Board is obligated and directed by the statute to determine the
proper unit of employees to be considered appropriate for collective
bargaining purposes."1 Thus, it is clear that one of the primary purposes of the Act is to protect the rights of employees and not just
those of unions and employers. It is in that context that this analysis
is undertaken.
I.

ADMINIsTRA1wE EFFECrIVENSS OF THE BUSH BOARD

As the Bush Board commenced its term in 1990, there was, and
had been for some time, much criticism about the length of time the
Board took to resolve cases and render decisions. Conscious of this,
the Board took steps to develop programs to reduce the backlog of
cases which had been at the Board for over two years and, at the
same time, to keep current with the existing intake of cases. This
effort produced the results listed in Table 12
Clearly, gains were made, as the two year and older backlog in
unfair labor practice cases was reduced from sixty to eight in the two
year period between 1989-1991 and continued to be reduced thereafter. 3 A like reduction occurred in the area of representation cases. 4 Similarly, the cases at the Board for over one year also reduced
substantially during the overall three and one-half year period. 5
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1988).

9. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988).
10.

29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988); compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) with 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)

(1988).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988).
12. These figures have been supplied by the Office of the Executive Secretary of the
National Labor Relations Board. To give a more complete picture of the number of unfair
labor practice charges filed and complaints issued, both of which are functions administered
by the General Counsel, these figures have also been included.
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id.
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TABLE 1

NLRB CASELOAD 1989-1992
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES

Fiscal
Year
1989
1990
1991
1992

Charges
Filed
32,401
33,833
32,271
32,317

Complaints
Issued
3,226
3,241
3,208
2,898

Decisions
Rendered
750
577
774
751

Total
Backlog
342
329
272
284

Over
1 Yr.
94
102
33
40

Over
2 Yrs.
52
28
8
9

Over
5 Yrs.
8
3
0
0

REPRESENTATION CASES

Fiscal
Year
1989
1990
1991

Petitions
Filed
8,477
7,674
6,652

Decisions
Rendered
288
282
282

Total
Backlog
95
90
76

Over
1 Yr.
18
14
10

Over
2 Yrs.
6
3
0

Over
5 Yrs.
0
0
0

1992

6,257

231

79

6

1

0
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From 1989 to 1992 the Board decided almost four thousand
cases. 6 While certainly many will disagree with my choice of cases
to represent the work of the Board, and I might well disagree with
theirs, some representative selection must be made. Since the generally accepted view is that oral argument is granted only in significant
cases where the Board wishes to settle an outstanding issue, or to
pronounce a change in the law, there may be some representative
significance in selecting oral argument cases for inclusion in this
discussion. Additionally, "Special Distribution" cases are selected by
the Executive Secretary of the Board to be cases of significance and
are included on a "Special Distribution List" circulated by the Executive Secretary to the Board Members, the General Counsel and the
Regional Directors to advise them of important new case law. As a
result, I have chosen to discuss those cases in which a request for
oral argument was granted and held, as well as those cases which are
termed "Special Distribution" cases.
H.

REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
LITHOGRAPHING Co. V.

-

NIELSEN

NLRB17

In June 1983, negotiation of a new contract between the Nielsen
Lithographing Company and the Graphic Communications International Union commenced. This was not the first negotiation between
the parties by any means - they had been negotiating labor contracts
for some forty years. Early in the negotiations the company's negotiator proposed a reduction in employee compensation and the benefit
package. The company's chief negotiator advised the union that the
company was still making a profit but that it needed "concessions" to
compete because increasing costs were resulting in a significant loss
of business to competitors. 8 He noted that trends indicated that in
the future, the company was going to have greater difficulty with
labor cost items which would force price increases, making the company even less competitive and resulting in lay-offs. 9
In these early negotiating meetings, the company actually furnished the union with various charts and graphs compiled from company records which it claimed supported the company's need for
concessions. The company's chief negotiator also pointed out to the

16.

id

17.
18.
19.

854 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1988).
Nielsen Lithographing Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 697, 697 (1991).
Id.
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union that while the company originally possessed a technological
advantage over its competitors by pioneering the use of a half-web
press, the competition had, by the time of the negotiations, obtained a
half-web press, resulting in the loss of this competitive advantage.
The union acknowledged that this was "not any new information to
[them]."' The company also presented the union with data illustrating that it was losing business to competitors whose wages and benefits were below those of the company, and the company's negotiating
team observed that its employees had already lost hours of work and
jobs to layoffs. 1
After hearing the company's position and reviewing the charts
and graphs presented by the company, the union's chief negotiator
requested that the company open its books and allow a union expert
to examine its financial records to verify the truth of the company's
assertions concerning future competitive disadvantage. The company's
negotiator responded that the company was not pleading poverty, that
it was in fact making money, but that it was losing its competitive
edge and, by the time of the next contract negotiations, would be in
financial difficulty.' Thereafter, the union made a detailed information request for documents which included: a) documents the employer had submitted to banks for the purposes of obtaining loans, including projected balance sheets and income statements; b) a list of all
supervisory employees and their total compensation; c) a list of nonunit employees who had been laid off and for how long; d) a list of
company officers' and owners' expense accounts; e) a list of cars
owned by the company; and f)an analysis of the working capital of
the company for the prior three years.'
While the company agreed to supply the union with any relevant
bargaining unit data, it refused to supply the union with the other
requested items.' When an impasse was reached the company implemented its proposal and the union engaged in a strike and filed a
Section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain charge, claiming the company refused to bargain by failing to provide the union with the requested
information.'
At a hearing before an administrative law judge, the union took

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 698.
Id.
Id.
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the position that it was entitled to financial information whenever the
company sought concessions.' The union negotiator also explained
that it needed the list of supervisors because the negotiating committee felt that if the company was not competitive it might be because
there were "too many chiefs and not enough Indians."' He testified
that the union needed a list of people who were not in the bargaining
unit and who had been laid off to determine whether, in the event
lay-offs were inevitable, there were other non-unit employees who
should be laid off along with the union people.' In its initial decision the Board found that the employer had violated Section 8(a)(5)
by not providing the union with the requested financial data.'
On review, the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board's
Order and remanded the case to the Board.' In its remand decision,
the Seventh Circuit directed the Board to reconsider its decision in
light of that court's then "recent" opinion in NLRB v. Harvstone
Manufacturing Corp.31 In Harvstone, the court found that the
company's claim of competitive disadvantage amounted to a contention during bargaining that it would not pay, as opposed to a claim
that it could not pay, what the union was demanding.32 The court in
Harvstone construed the employer's claim of competitive disadvantage
simply as an acknowledgement of an economic fact of life: if companies "don't make a reasonable profit so they can be a viable competitive business, they won't stay in business and no one will have
jobs."33 This, said the court, was nothing more than a truism and did
not rise to the level of a claim of present inability to pay.'
Interestingly, in Harvstone, the Seventh Circuit also considered
whether a claim of future competitive disadvantage, not limited to the
term of the contract under negotiations, translated into a claim of
inability to pay. The court observed in response to that issue that "if
an employer operates at a competitive disadvantage for a long enough
time, its profit margin as a matter of pure economics, will decline
and eventually force it out of business."'35 But the court emphasized

26.

Id.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Nielsen Lithographimg Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 877 (1986).
Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1988).
785 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1986).
Harvstone Mfg., 785 F.2d at 577.

33. Id. at 576.
34. Id. at 576-77.
35. Id. at 577.
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that the relevant time period is "that of the term of the new collective
bargaining agreement." The court concluded that an employer's
claim that competitive disadvantage will ultimately lead to an inability
to pay at some future time does not preclude a finding that "at least
for the term of the new collective bargaining agreement - the employer operating at a competitive disadvantage is financially able,
although perhaps unwilling, to pay increased wages."37
On remand, the Bush Board reversed its prior decision and dismissed the complaint in a split decision. 8 The Board majority39
found no Truitt' violation' I concurred and found that the statements made by management in the case were not susceptible to a
"cannot" pay finding. 2 The majority emphasized that the company's
negotiator repeatedly stated that the company was still making a
profit, even though the company was losing business to competitors
and in the negotiations specifically disavowed any claim or inability
to pay during the period of the proposed new contract.43 The Board
majority acknowledged that the company had asserted that at some
unspecified point in the future, it was going to have a problem with
labor costs but it found in these statements nothing that could fairly
suggest that the company would be so unprofitable during the term of
the contract under negotiation that it could not pay what the union
was demanding." The company, it held, was claiming only that it
might not make as much of a profit if it did not get the concessions
that it requested.' The Board stressed that the employer's efforts to
maximize profits or to reallocate expenses among various categories
do not in and of themselves constitute a claim of financial inability to
pay, as contemplated by Truitt.4
I agreed with my colleagues' analysis but said that requiring the
employer in this case to supply the requested information would not

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Nielsen Lithographing Co., 305 N.L.1RB. 697 (1991).
39. Members Devaney and Raudabaugh.
40. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (holding that an employer may not refuse to provide a union with information about its financial status when asserting an inability
to pay an increase in wages).
41. Nielsen Lithographing, 305 N.L.R.B. at 701.
42. Id. at 701-03.
43. Id. at 700-01.
44. Id. at 701.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.'

It

was my view that the company's position concerning its competitive
stance was not sufficiently capable of accurate verification by the
union to aid the bargaining process. Instead, requiring the company to
supply the information requested by the union could well bog down
bargaining and develop into a debate over management's inability to
track the future direction of the company.
Chairman Stephens dissented and emphasized the fact that the
employer had linked his concession to the loss of jobs currently held
by the employees; and thus, put in issue the status of present economic condition to the point where the union was entitled to obtain
financial information to verify that condition, under the principles of
Truitt.4 The Chairman thought his disagreement with the majority
was one that turned on the relevance of information related to claims
of economic hardships that fall short of a claim of inability to pay. 9
Contrary to the majority, he found that some claims of economic
hardship trigger the duty to supply information on the financial condition of the company, not just the inability to pay as encompassed by
Truitt.5" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's
decision 1
In Continental Winding Co.,2 one of four companion cases 3
decided by the Board the same day as Nielsen, the employer expressed during bargaining its desire to remain competitive when the
question of wages and other benefits were brought up in negotiations.' The company's chief negotiator expressly denied throughout
negotiations that the company was claiming any inability to pay.5
The Board, however, was persuaded that the company had in fact
claimed it was unable to pay when company officials had stated
among other things that: a) the company could not afford to keep its
doors open; b) there was no money in the business; c) the company

47. Id.
48. Id. at 703.
49. Id. at 707.
50. Id.
51. Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir.
1992).
52. 305 N.L.R.B. 122 (1991).
53. Aneron Pipe Prods., 305 N.L.R.B. 105 (1991); Concrete Pipe and Prods. Corp., 305
N.L.R.B. 152 (1991); Continental Winding Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 122 (1991); Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. 112 (1991).
54. Continental Winding, 305 N.L.R.B. at 134.
55. Id. at 133-34.
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had lost 50% of its business; d) the president of the company had not
drawn money from the company for over three years - he and the
company had been losing money for the past three years and the
company was "in the red" for the current year; e) the company's
president had obtained a personal loan so that the company could
meet its payroll and other financial obligations; f) the company expected a $60,000 loss by year's end; g) other members of the association of which the company was a member had become insolvent,
after being unionized; and h) there was no money in the company
and the union could not "squeeze blood from a turnip."
The test the Board will apply in these request for information
cases seems to be clear. The Board will not be governed solely by
what the employer says but will rather examine its position and other
statements it makes during negotiations. Thus, if its "will not pay"
statements do not support or are not consistent with other employer
statements or actions during the negotiations, the Board will find a
claim of inability to pay and the employer will have violated the Act
by not providing the union with requested relevant information. Likewise, the Board also held that an employer seeking concessions from
the union does not ipso facto require the employer to provide the
union with financial information upon request.'
Clearly then, if an employer is trying to seek refuge by claiming
it is not stating an inability to pay, but its actions speak otherwise,
this Board would be more inclined to require the employer to provide
the requested information under the doctrine of Truitt.58 On the other
hand, where an employer is consistent in its approach and is not
trying to merely evade the bargaining and information request obligation, it would appear that the Bush Board would not extend the Truitt
doctrine to require the employer to provide the relevant financial
information upon request in concessionary bargaining.
The decisions also instructed the parties that an employer seeking
concessions due to a competitive disadvantage, but not pleading inability to pay, is not governed by the Truitt principles and thus is not
required to comply with a union request for financial information 9

56. Id. at 141.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 40.
59. Aneron Pipe Prods., 305 N.L.R.B. at 109; Concrete Pipe, 305 N.L.R.B. at 163;
Georgia-Pacific,305 N.L.R.B. at 117; Continental Winding, 305 N.L.R.B. at 141.
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mT[.

RELOCATION OF OPFRATIONS -

DUBUQUE PACKING

In the much heralded Dubuque Packing case,' the Board issued

an important decision that governs an employer's obligation concerning a decision to relocate all or part of its operations in a somewhat

complicated but fact specific situation. The question in Dubuque
involved what test the Board should apply in determining when an

employer must bargain with a union copcerning a decision to relocate
unit work.
In Dubuque, the employer, a meat packer, decided to relocate its
hog, kill and cut operations from its home plant in Dubuque, Iowa to
a new plant in Rochelle, Illinois." It did not bargain with the union
representing the involved employees regarding the decision to move
this operation.'
The essential facts were as follows. In 1978, the company and
the union negotiated an agreement requiring the workers to produce at
a higher rate in return for a one-time cash payment. In August
1980, the company extracted concessions from the union including
elimination of incentive pay.' These concessions were worth approximately five million dollars per year.' In return, the company
pledged that it would not ask for further concessions before September 21, 1982, the expiration date of the union contract then in effect.' However, in March 1981 the employer again requested concessions in the form of additional productivity in its hog, kill and cut
department.' When this request was rejected by the union, the employer gave six months notice, as required by the labor contract, of
its intention to close the hog, kill and cut operation in Dubuque.'
There were discussions between the union and the company, including
a company request for a wage freeze, which were aimed at keeping
the Dubuque hog, kill and cut operation open for the balance of the

60. Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991), enforced and union's petition for
review granted and remanded, United Food Workers, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 24 (D.C.
Cit. 1993).
61. Id. at 387.
62. Id. at 396-97.
63. Dubuque Packing Co., 287 N.L.R.B. 499, 502 (1987).
64. Id. at 505.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 504.
67. Id. at 506.
68. Id. at 507.
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contract.' The union rejected these proposals and the day following
the rejection, the company announced for the first time that it was
planning to relocate, rather than close, its hog, kill and cut department." The union responded by requesting detailed financial information from the company substantiating its financial condition which
the company refused to provide 1 Dubuque then advised its employees in writing that they could save their jobs by approving its wage
freeze proposal.' In June 1981, the wage freeze proposal was resubmitted to the workers for a vote.' The resubmission was accompanied by the union leadership's recommendation that it be rejected
until Dubuque provided the financial information earlier requested by
the union. The workers voted overwhelmingly to reject the proposal: 4 Three days later, Dubuque informed the union that its decision
to close the hog, kill and cut department was "irrevocable," and in
July, Dubuque purchased the Rochelle, Illinois plant 5
Dubuque and the union continued to negotiate during the next
few months over Dubuque's proposed relocation of other operations.
During this time the union continued to request negotiations over the
relocation of the hog, kill and cut operation but the company advised
that such operations were closing and refused to bargain over the
decision.76 On October 1st, Dubuque's newly acquired Rochelle plant
began full operation and two days later the company eliminated approximately 530 hog, kill and cut jobs at the Dubuque plant." On
October 19, 1981, an agreement was signed between the company
and the union, granting wage concessions for the remaining workers
at the Dubuque plant in return for the company's agreement to keep
900 jobs in Dubuque and to extend the current labor agreement.' By
early 1982 however, the company's hope for obtaining new financing
had collapsed, taking with it Dubuque's prospects for remaining in
business in Dubuque and Rochelle." Subsequently, both plants were

69. Id. at 510.
70.

Id. at 510-11.

71. Id. at 510, 513.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 514.

74. Id.
75.

Id. at 515-16.

76. Id. at 517.
77.
78.

Id. at 525.
Id. at 527-28.

79. Id. at 534.
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closed and sold on October 15, 1982.'
The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board and
complaints were issued. Those complaints claimed that Dubuque had
refused to bargain in good faith with respect to the decision to relocate the hog, kill and cut operation, claiming especially the
company's alleged duplicity and its refusal to disclose financial data." An administrative law judge rendered a decision in the case on
June 17, 1985. The judge, suggesting that Dubuque's conduct did fall
below the standard of good faith bargaining, nevertheless held that
Dubuque did not commit an unfair labor practice because the company was not under any duty to negotiate over its decision to relocate.' The Board affirmed the judge's decision, adopting the findings
and opinion.' The District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded
the case, declaring that the Board's opinion had been inadequately explained." At that time, the"only extant law failed to provide a single
test for determining whether companies were bound to bargain over a
decision concerning partial relocation.' The Circuit Court of Appeals
held that given the confusion in the law, it could not trace the
Board's reasoning in Dubuque to ensure that the Board's action was
not arbitrary." Thus, the court remanded Dubuque to the Board for
further consideration, strongly advising the Board to develop and
apply a single standard.'
On remand the Board unanimously approved a new test that
differed from all three tests which had been set forth in Otis I. The
Board applied this new test to the relocation of Dubuque's hog, kill
and cut operation and found that a duty to bargain had existed and
had been breached.' Dubuque was ordered to pay back-wages to all
employees terminated as a result of the relocation from the date of
their termination until October 15, 1982, the date operations ceased in
Dubuque, Iowa and Rochelle, Illinois. 9 In developing this single test,
the Board developed an analysis and weaved itself a narrow road
between.

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 529.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 538-41.

83. Id. at 499.
84.
85.

United Food Workers, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) [hereinafter Otis I].

86. United Food Workers, 880 F.2d at 1439.
87. Id. at 1436-37.
88. Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991).

89. Id. at 399.
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The developed test was as follows:
1. The burden will initially be on -the Board's General Counsel to
establish that the employer's decision involved a relocation of unit
work unaccompanied by a basic change in the nature of the
employer's operations.
2. When the General Counsel meets this initial burden then a prima
facie case is established.
3. At this point the employer may produce evidence rebutting the
prima facie case by establishing that the work performed at the new
location varies significantly from the work performed at the former
plant, by establishing that the work performed at the former plant is
to be discontinued entirely and not moved to the new location, or
by establishing that the employer's decision involved a change in
the scope in direction of the enterprise.
4. Alternatively, the employer may show that (a) labor costs (direct
and/or indirect) were not a factor in the decision; or (b) even if
labor costs were a factor in the decision, the union could not have
offered labor cost concessions that could have changed the
employer's decision to relocate.'
In applying the test the Board found that the company had made
labor costs a determinative factor in its decision to relocate and that
the relocation decision was therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining.91 The Board did not respond to the failure to supply financial
information question, but did indicate that if the union deliberately
delays, for example by making frivolous information requests, the
Board will be guided by that fact as it applies to impasse.' The
Board emphasized that there may be circumstances where a relocation
decision must be made or implemented expeditiously or where there
are special or emergency circumstances that would make bargaining
about that situation difficult.Y
On August 10, 1993, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed the Board's Order and its ratio-

90.
91.

Id. at 391.
Id. at 393

92. Id. at 392.
93. Id.
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nale stating that:
we find that the Board's test does not impermissibly fail to protect

[And]
management's prerogatives over capital investment ....
[flinally, we find no fatal uncertainty in the Board's test as it applies to these facts. As we explain below the Board's ruling easily
survives Dubuque's contention that the test requirements were not
met in regard to this particular relocation. Employers should have
no trouble understanding that actions such as Dubuque's run afoul
of the Board's newly articulated standard. 9'
This decision in many ways put to rest, for the time being at
least, the struggle that has existed between rulings in Fibreboard'
and First National Maintenance," where in footnote 22 the Supreme
Court specifically excluded plant relocations from the application of
First National Maintenance on the theory that the employer's core of

entrepreneurial control must not be disturbed.' The test provides the
parties with a workable model and is intended for application in
factual situations that present a question of whether, in the interest of
practical labor relations, negotiations should be undertaken to drive
the parties to the bargaining table to discuss the relocation. Such is

consistent with the purposes of the Act which support the settlement
of disputes through collective bargaining." This decision appears to

provide the parties with a test which is clearly applicable in the factual framework of day-to-day negotiations. 9
IV.

TIMELY BARGAINING EFFECTS OF A SALE

The issue of when an employer must bargain with a recognized
collective bargaining representative about the effects of the employer's
sale of its business was again considered in Riedel International

94. United Food Workers Local 150-A v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 24, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
95. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (holding that an employer must bargain with union prior to subcontracting out work for the purpose of reducing
labor costs).
96. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (holding an employer's
economically motivated decision to shut down part of its business is not a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining).
97. Id. at 686 n.22.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
99. Following these decisions the employer and the union both recognized that the employer had an obligation to discuss the impact of the sale of a company upon the employees
and their jobs with their union at a meaningful time and not after the sale had become a
fait accompli.
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(Willamette Tug & Barge Co.)." Previously, in 1973, the Board had
decided in Walter Pape, Inc."°1 that an employer (seller) was obligated to advise the union and discuss with it the impact of a decision
to sell when the sale was "under active consideration" by a potential
buyer. This appeared to mean that when an employer and a potential
buyer are seriously talking about reaching an agreement of sale, the
employer is obligated to notify the union and bargain upon request
with respect to the effects of the sale upon the seller's employees.
This standard was reconsidered by the Bush Board in its 1990
Willamette decision.
Riedel had been negotiating a possible sale of its Willamette
assets to the Knappton Corporation since December 198721 The negotiations continued until April when it became evident that this asset
sale would not be consummated until the principals of each company
met and negotiated the final issues."° On April 14th, such negotiations took place and a memorandum of agreement was signed late
that evening which was to be effective on April 15th." 4 On the
morning of April 15th, by prearrangement, the employees of the
purchaser (Knappton) were manning Willamette's dispatch office and
responding to calls for "ship assist" placed to Willamette's existing
telephone number." Also, by prearrangement in the purchase
agreement and effective that morning, Willamette had assigned to
Knappton control of the Willamette owned tugs and barges even
though financing for the sale had not yet been committed by the
banks."° Following conferences with the bank and financing commitments by them, at 11:45 on the morning of April 15th, the seller's
representative came to the union's office and presented the union's
agent with a letter advising that Knappton had purchased Willamette's
assets and that Willamette was closing operations as of the close of
business that day.Y This was the first and only notice the union
had received that there had been ongoing negotiations for the sale of
Willamette."°8 Respondent's agents further explained that
Willamette's employees represented by the union would be terminated
100. 300 N.L.R.B. 282 (1990).
101. 205 N.L.R.B. 719 (1973).
102. Willarette, 300 N.L.R.B. at 283.
103. Id. at 284.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

108.

Id.
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when the business closed that day and that the current labor agreement and the bargaining relationship between Willamette and the
union would likewise be terminated at the end of the day.'m Approximately fifteen minutes later, Willamette's deck hands received
their own letters from the company stating that with "regref'
Willamette had "closed operations" and therefore the employees'
employment
with the company was being terminated that same
110
day.

Thereafter, on April 19th, the union wrote the respondent to
protest the sale and the seller's failure to negotiate, the effect of the
sale having constituted a contract violation and demanded a meeting
to bargain over the effects of the sale upon the employees."' The
union also stated that it would file unfair labor practice charges."
Willamette then replied that it had not committed a contract violation
and promised to meet on April 28th to bargain over the effects."'
On April 28th, the union presented respondent with a written list of
demands, including severance pay linked to length of service, continuation of certain health benefits contributions for a fixed period and a
good faith commitment on the part of Willamette to employ laid-off
employees at other operations of the company." 4 No agreement was
reached and the record does not disclose whether there were any
other negotiations." 5 The union consequently filed unfair labor practice charges6 claiming a refusal to bargain by the seller,
Willamette."
It should be noted at the outset, that there was no claim by the
union that Willamette owed the union a duty to bargain over its
decision to sell the company." 7 The General Counsel conceded that
respondent Willamette could make that decision unilaterally under the
doctrine established by the Supreme Court in First National Maintenance."' The claim was clearly and solely that the employer failed
to bargain over the effects of the sale in accordance with its obliga-

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 96.
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tion to bargain in a timely fashion." 9 The Board held that the General Counsel was on firm ground in claiming that the duty to bargain
over the "effects" of a decision to sell normally contemplates that the
employer must give "advanced" or some pre-sale notice to the union. 20

In defense of its position, Willamette made two claims. Initially,
the employer argued that a possible sale to a particular buyer cannot
be regarded as an actual decision to sell.' Likewise, since the decision to sell was not reached until April 14th, there was no earlier
opportunity to advise the union that it had made such a decision to
sell the corporation's assets." Therefore, it claimed that it had no
obligation to bargain until an agreement to sell had been reached."
The administrative law judge, following Walter Pape, 4 found
that the employer presented the union with a fait accompli in that the
sale had been concluded on April 14th and the employees were notified the following day when the financing arrangements were finalized. He found that by February the negotiations, while complex
and uncertain that a sale would be effectuated, had reached "the serious stage" and that the seller had disclosed to both his labor consultant and his primary financing institution that it was negotiating
with Knappton for the sale of the operation." Thus, he concluded
that by mid-February the respondent believed that there was a substantial likelihood that the negotiations would lead to an agreement.'2
Likewise, he found that the company was not engaged in parallel
negotiations with any other prospective purchaser. It had no backup negotiation or backup buyer even though it had previously indicated that the reason for the sale was the precarious financial situation
of the corporation.'" Accordingly, he found that when the board of
directors of Willamette made the decision in December to sell the
company, it was at that time that the duty developed to inform and

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Willamette, 300 N.L.R.B. at 289.
Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 284-85.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 100.
Willamette, 300 N.L.R.B. at 285.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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meet upon demand with the union to discuss the effect of the
sale." He concluded that any other analysis "would often leave a
union without practical strength to bargain over the effects of the sale
of an enterprise.'' He cited as his support Metropolitan Teletronics
32
Corp.
As a second defense, the respondent claimed that the negotiations
had to be kept secret from the public in order to enhance the asset to
the buyer and thus enable the respondent to secure enough cash to
meet its debt requirement concerns." The respondent's attorney testified that the tug and barge business on the Willamette River was
extremely competitive and both Willamette and Knappton were fearful
that premature publicity about the sale would result in widespread
knowledge among the local business community that Willamette was
entertaining a sale and could lead to many of its customers taking
their business to other tug and barge companies." The judge found
this was not a legitimate concern and insufficient to nullify the
union's presumptive right to advance notice. 35 Thus, the judge held,
citing the rule of Walter Pape which stated that "at the very least,
respondent should have advised the union that the termination of
[business] routes was under active consideration and was imminent," ' 36 that Willamette had not fulfilled its obligation to bar37
gain.
The Board affirmed the judge, but overruled portions of the
Walter Pape doctrine." It held that the union was entitled to "as
much notice of the closing and termination of employees as was
needed for meaningful bargaining at a meaningful time."'39 While it
refused to find exactly how many days notice would be required, the
Board did hold that same day notice was clearly insufficient." In
overruling Walter Pape to the extent that it was inconsistent with the
decision, the Board stated that

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 279 N.L.R.B 957 (1986), enforced, 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that timely notice to the union is an element of meaningful bargaining).
133. Willamette, 300 N.L.R.B. at 286.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Walter Pape, 205 N.L.R.B. at 720.
137. Willamette, 300 N.L.R.B. at 286.
138. Id. at 282.
139. Id. at 283.
140. Id.
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the sale of a business, unlike certain other nonbargainable decisions
involving the scope and direction of a business, is not unilateral in
character. The sale may fall through at any time before a purchase
agreement is reached. Accordingly, we find no merit in the General
Counsel's contention that, for effects-bargaining purposes, an employer is obligated to provide notice
to the union as soon as the
1 41
sale is "under active consideration."
It went on to find that although the decision to sell did not
occur until the execution of a binding agreement to sell, that a violation still existed because the employer's failure to provide the union
with any meaningful notice, prior to the actual sale and transfer of
the assets, that the seller was ceasing business and terminating its
employees." The Board reasoned:
if a seller and a purchaser can be expected to negotiate about, and
draft their agreement to provide for satisfaction of, various contingencies such as governmental clearances, so, too, should they be
able to account for the human factor - the employees' interest in
having their designated representative notified and given an opportunity to bargain about the effects of the sale. That circumstances
may compel confidentiality in arriving at a sales agreement does not
obviate the employer's duty to give pre-implementation notice to the
union to allow time for effects bargaining, provision for which may
be negotiated in the sales agreement. We do not presume here to
advise corporate negotiators how to accommodate the right of a
union to negotiate effect of this sale on the employees it represents.' 3
Thus, while affirming the judge, the Board established a new
test. In sale situations, enough time must be given so that meaningful
negotiations may occur, or accommodation for such must be made in
the purchase and sale agreement in order for the employer to meet its
statutory obligation to bargain over the effects of a sale with the
union." This rule protects the rights of employees and gives their
representative union an opportunity to negotiate that which it was
entitled to negotiate (the effect of the sale) within the confines of
business necessity.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 282.
Id.
Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 283.
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In a companion case, Los Angeles Soap Co.,45 the Board
adopted the judge's opinion, citing Willamette. There, the purchaser
(Valley) demanded that there be no information provided with respect
to the sale to anyone and, if any information did leak out, it could
mean that the sale would not be consummated " The seller (employer) and his wife worked in secret so as to not compromise the
need for confidentiality and alone prepared the necessary documents
for the sale to the purchaser.47 The subject of confidentiality was
repeatedly discussed during a series of telephone conversations from
November 23rd to December 4th.' 4 While the negotiations commenced on November 14th and on November 17th a "round figure"
was established as the purchase price, the sale was not consummated
until December 4th when the seller's board of directors met and approved the sale.44 Later that same afternoon, the employer met with
day-shift employees and informed them that the company was closing
permanently and would cease operations." ° The judge rejected the
seller's argument of special or emergency circumstances and held that
this case did not create an exception to the rule announced in
Willamette. Again the Board refused to address the question of when
the employer's duty to notify the union first arose and instead affirmed the judge, citing Willamette as its authority.' In both cases,
a Transmarine'" remedy was applied.
These two cases are important because they adhere to the established principle that the union is entitled to sufficient notice to constructively bargain over the effects of a sale and also because they
adopt a more realistic solution than the one announced in Walter
Pape. Clearly, since it is impossible in many economic transactions to
be sure that a sale will be consummated, it is likewise impractical to
commence negotiations with the union with respect to the effects of
the pending "sale" on the employees when the sale is only a possibility. However, in Willamette, irrespective of the economic and security

145. 300 N.L.R.B. 289 (1990).
146. Id. at 292.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 291-92.
150. Id. at 292.
151. Id. at 289 & n.1.
152. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389 (1968). A Transmarine remedy
seeks to restore the union, as nearly as possible, to the status it would have occupied had
the employer given timely notice. To accomplish this, the employer is ordered to bargain
with the union over the effects of its decision and to provide backpay. Id
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reasons the company gave not to provide notice, the Board affirmed
the basic principle that notice must be given prior to an actual sale
when the negotiations would be more than pro forma because the sale
was a fait accompli." It held that a provision could be made in the
purchase and sale agreement to conclude the negotiations with the
union before the closing of the sale, or other contract arrangements
could be made to accommodate this contingent close-down liability."5 Los Angeles Soap also provided that some prior notice was
necessary; but, it should be noted that it backed away from indicating
that the three or four days notice mentioned in the judge's decision in
his reference to Emsing's Supermarket'" was insufficient." Therefore, it may well be that three or four days advanced notice would
have been satisfactory under Willamette. In any event, it can be argued that this is a more realistic solution to a difficult practical, economic and negotiating problem. Parties must have the freedom to
negotiate the purchases and sales of businesses, but their obligations
to bargain with employee representatives must be met in a time frame
that leaves the representative and the employer with an opportunity to
effectively conclude and solve the resulting impact of the sale on the
employees.
V.

CoNPANY-EMPLOYEE CommmE
AND

-

ELECTROMATION

DuPoNT

Clearly, two of the most publicized Board decisions of the last
five years are Electromation, Inc.' and E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co.' Both cases considered the question of whether an employer-employee committee was a labor organization under Section 2(5) of
the Ac" and, if so, whether the company had dominated, assisted
or otherwise violated the Act by involving itself too deeply in the
formation and operation of one or more of these committees.
Electromation, decided in December 1992, involved a non-union
facility. On the other hand, DuPont, decided in May 1993, involved

153. Willamette, 300 N.L.R.B. at 282.
154. Id.
155. NLRB v. Erasing's Supermarket, 872 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1989).
156. Los Angeles Soap, 300 N.L.1B. at 289 n.1. Judge Stevenson agreed with the General Counsel that three to four days notice was insufficient. Id. at 295.
157. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
158. 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (May 28, 1993).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
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the operation of these committees in a union facility. Both have been
characterized as impact decisions which, depending upon your point
of view, may require an amendment to the law. These cases are made
prominent by an apparent growing emphasis by the government, as
well as experts in the field of employee motivation, encouraging more
employer and employee joint involvement and participation in decision-making.1 " Some even say that this is necessary if we are to
compete globally in the next decade.'' With that type of rhetoric as
background, it may be helpful to look at the facts of each case and
the decisions rendered.
Electromation is a company involved in the manufacture of electrical products in Indiana and employs approximately 200 people."
In late 1988, as a result of financial difficulty, it decided to eliminate
expenses by altering the existing employee attendance bonus policy
and by making other working condition changes." In lieu of a
wage increase scheduled for 1989, it decided to distribute year-end
lump sum payments based upon an employee's length of service."
Shortly after that announcement, the employees left for their
Christmas vacation and returned shortly after the first of the year with
a sense of deep concern, troubled by the elimination of these bonuses
and other changes." They let their feelings be known around the
plant and the employer became aware of such feelings.'" In early
January 1989, the company received a petition signed by sixty-eight
employees expressing displeasure with a new attendance policy."
The company's president met with the supervisors to discuss the
petition and the employees' complaints and then decided to meet
directly with the employees to discuss their problems." On January
l1th the employer selected a group of eight employees and discussed
with them a number of issues including wages, hours, incentive pay,
attendance programs and leave policy - all, of course, are wage and

160.

See, e.g., ube Shiver, Jr., NLRB Orders DuPont to Deal Directly with Union, L.A.

TIMES, June 8, 1993, at DL.
161. See, e.g., Steven I. Locke, Comment, Keeping Sections 2(5) and 8(i)(2) of the NLRA
Intact: A Fresh Look at Worker Participation Committees through Electromation, Inc., 10

HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 375 (1992).
162.
163.

Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 990.
Id.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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working condition concerns."
Seven days later on January 18th the company's president met
again with the same group of eight employees.'" At this meeting he
explained to those present that he had distilled the employee's complaints into five separate categories and that he was going to create
action committees that "would meet and try to come up with ways to
resolve these problems; and that if they came up with solutions
that... [the company] believed were within budget concerns
and ...

generally felt would be acceptable to the employees, that

[the company] would implement these suggestions or proposals. 17 '
The employees indicated that they were not in agreement with respect
to these action committees."n They did not wish any more study they wanted some answers, as they explained it. As the meeting continued, the company's president was under the belief that the employees began to understand that it was better to try to solve the problems than to leave things as they were, and that the company was not
going to unilaterally reverse the decisions already made.'" Thus, the
company's president indicated that they accepted the idea of these
action committees and agreed that employees would not be selected at
random for the committees; instead, the company would post sign-up
sheets.174

On January 19th, the respondent posted a memorandum directed
to all employees announcing the formation of five action committees."

Each committee would be involved with a specific topic,

such as absenteeism policy, pay promotion and others.1 7 Each action
committee would consist of six employees, one or two members of
management, and the company's employee benefits manager who
would coordinate all the activities of the action committees. 1" The
sign-up sheets explained the responsibilities and goals of each committee.178 The employees were not involved in the drafting of the
memoranda or notices which contained the policy goals and the company, alone, determined the number of employees permitted to sign

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 990-91.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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up for each committee." The company informed two employees
who had signed up for more than one committee that each would be
limited to only one committee."
The five committees that were announced were as follows: Absenteeism/Infractions; No-Smoking Policy; Communication Network;
Pay Progression for Premium Positions; and Attendance Bonus Program."' In late January, the first meetings of the action committees
were held." The Action Committee Coordinator, Loretta Dickey
(the Employee Benefits Manager), testified that
management expected that employee members on the Committees
would "kind of talk back and forth" with other employees in the
plant, get their ideas, and that, indeed, the purpose of the
Respondent's postings was to ensure that "anyone [who] wanted to
know what was going on, they could go to these people.'
Other management representatives also participated in the committees."1
The company paid employees for their time spent participating in the committee work and supplied necessary materials for the
committee's work, as well as the conference room available for the
meetings themselves.'
Approximately three weeks after the meetings had commenced,
the union demanded recognition from the company." It was clear
that the company had no prior knowledge of organizing efforts by the
union until the date upon which the demand was made.'" On February 21st, the company's president informed Committee Coordinator
Dickey of the recognition demand and, at the next scheduled meeting
of each action committee, Dickey informed the members of the committees that the respondent could no longer participate, but, that the
employees could continue to meet if they so desired." Two of the
committees continued to meet." The Pay Progression Committee
decided to disband and the Attendance Bonus Committee decided to

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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write a proposal which they had discussed previously and then to not
meet again."
The Attendance Bonus Committee's proposal was one of two
proposals that the employees had developed concerning attendance
bonuses."' The first one was developed during the second or third
meeting of that action committee, but was rejected as too costly by
the company's controller, also a member of that committee."n Thereafter, the committee devised a second proposal which the controller
deemed fiscally sound." The proposal was never offered because
the union's campaign intervened between the time of the approval
and the time the proposal would be presented by the action committee to the company president."
The administrative law judge found that the action committees
which were created to discuss wages, hours and working conditions
were labor organizations within the definition of Section 2(5)."' He
thereupon found that the respondent's company dominated and assisted the committees on the basis of evidence that the respondent
organized the committees, created their nature and structure and determined their various functions." As for assistance, he noted that
since the meetings had taken place on company property, the matedals used by the committees had been supplied by the company and
the members were paid for time spent on committee work, these
committees were assisted by the employer in violation of Section
8(a)(2) of the Act.'
The operative sections of the Act involved here, and in DuPont,
were Sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5). Section 8(a)(2) provides that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it:
Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published
by the Board pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with them during work-

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
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ing hours without loss of time or pay."
A labor organization is defined by Section 2(5) of the Act as
follows:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind,
or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or the
conditions of work.1"9
To find a violation, therefore, there must be a finding that a labor
organization exists and this, as one would expect, was the first inquiry made by the Board. The entire Board agreed that these committees
were labor organizations.' They were clearly established for the
purpose of, and in fact did engage in, the discussion of wages, hours
and working conditions. 1 There seemed to be little dispute with the
conclusion that the committees were labor organizations, except from
Member Devaney who indicated that in order to qualify as a labor
organization the committee is required to represent some employees. Member Devaney found from the evidence in the record that
since the committees consisted of employees who participated in the
committees and the committees represented other employees, they met
the statutory definition of a labor organization.' Since the discussion of wages, hours and working conditions was the purpose of the
committees, he concluded that a labor organization existed and that a
Section 8(a)(2) violation had resulted because the committees were
created in response to the employees' disaffection concerning conditions of employment.' Moreover, he concluded, because of the
company's involvement with the formation of the committees and its
continuing support of the committees, a Section 8(a)(2) violation had
occurred.
I, on the other hand, found that since these committees were

198. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
200. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 997, 998-99 (Member Devaney, concurring), 1004
(Member Oviatt, concurring), 1014 (Member Raudabaugh, concurring).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1003.
203. Id. at 1003.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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established "for the purpose" of discussing wages, hours and conditions of employment with the employer, they were labor organizations
under Section 2(5); therefore, I also concluded that, based upon the
employer's involvement and support, the five committees were dominated and assisted by management in violation of Section 8(a)(2).
Member Raudabaugh also concurred and had little difficulty in
finding a violation of Section 8(a)(2) which, of course, encompassed
the finding that the committees were labor organizations under the
Act.' However, he called for a new interpretation of NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding Co.' and argued that the Newport News
decision places a premium on the continuation of the adversarial
model of conflict between labor and management, but did not speak
to current day, post Taft-Hartley statutory legislative history and practices.' For instance, he indicated that "Newport News is not a
straightjacket, and the NLRB, as the agency charged with interpreting
the Act to reflect industrial reality, can and should interpret the Act
to reflect the changes described herein."
Those changes, in his view, were Congress' adoption of the
National Productivity and Equality of Working Life Act of 1975210
and the Labor-Management Cooperation Act of 1978,u both of

which emphasized cooperative efforts between labor and management
to improve the productivity of the nation's economy.21 He concluded by indicating that the NLRB is obligated to apply the reality of
the workplace to its decisions and to bring that reality to its interpretation of law and that with the amendments to the Act, by the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947, the focus of the law
changed to protect employees rather than to guard against the industrial strength of the employer as was the case under the Act prior to
those amendments.
Therefore, Member Raudabaugh suggested that a new test be
applied which does not foreclose a fresh interpretation of Section
8(a)(2) and urged that the question of Section 8(a)(2) violations be
determined by an analysis which would include the following factors:
206. Id. at 1009 (stating that "if [Employee Participation Programs] are to be lawful,
Section 2(5) will have to be changed legislatively unless Section 8(a)(2) can be reinterpreted
so as to accommodate such programs.").
207. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
208. Electromation, 309 N.L.B. at 1012.
209. Id.
210. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2471 (1988).
211. 29 U.S.C. §§ 173(c), 175(a), 175(b) (1988).
212. Electromation, 309 N.L.LB. at 1012-13.
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(1) the extent of the employer's involvement in the structure and
operation of the committees; (2) whether the employees, from an
objective standpoint, reasonably perceive the [Employee Participation
Program] as a substitute for full collective bargaining through a
traditional union; (3) whether employees have been assured of their
Section 7 right to choose to be represented by a traditional union
under a system of full collective bargaining, and (4) the employer's
motives in establishing the [Employee Participation Program]. 1
In applying his test he found a violation as well and joined the
majority of Stephens, Devaney and myself. Thus, the majority concluded that under the Act, as well as case law, the action committees
developed by Electromation in the manner in which they were developed and administered, and the purposes for which these committees
were created, constituted a clear violation of Section 8(a)(2).1 4
While the issues in DuPont were similar to those presented in
Electromation, the facts were clearly different because of the union
setting in which DuPont was operating. 15 Thus, an additional unfair
labor practice charge was included in the complaint to the effect that
the company had bypassed the union in establishing, creating and
operating the committees and dealing with the safety committees
which were the centerpiece of this dispute in violation of Section
8(a)(5) as well as Section 8(a)(2) of the Act."'
DuPont had a history of developing and implementing various
programs which heightened employee concern for safety matters at its
Deepwater, New Jersey plant. Prior to 1984 the company implemented its safety program through safety committees comprised solely of
managerial personnel. 1 7 These committees had bestowed prizes and
various awards to employees who had been particularly conscious of
safety matters."' Since August 1984 the company had also been utilizing a Personal Effectiveness Process ("PEP") which encouraged
decision maldng through consensus." 9 In 1987, the PEP program
was extended to the Safety Committees.'

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
at 4-5
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 1013.
Id. at 998.
E. . du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (May 28, 1993).
Id. at 1.
E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., Case No. 4-CA-18737-1, N.L.B., ALT slip op.
(May 13, 1992).
Id.at 4.
Id.at 5.
Id.
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In 1987, the company created six safety and one fitness committee consistent with the PEP design. " The General Counsel alleged
in his complaint that all seven of these committees were unlawfully
dominated labor organizations.' The judge agreed and a Board panel of Devaney, Raudabaugh and myself agreed with the judge. Member Devaney wrote a separate concurring opinion.
The judge found that the company initiated the committees,
selected the employees, offered committee membership, and determined the number of employees on each committee. ' Each
committee's members also included management personnel.' Likewise, the judge found that while the committees continued in existence only at the will of the company, committee members served
indefinite periods of time without any employee rotation on or off the
committees.' Employees were paid for their time spent on committee matters, as well as for performing committee functions and the
company paid for all committee expenses.' The judge also found
that management controlled the agenda to be discussed at the meetings and approved all committee decisions.' The formula for committee decision was by "consensus" which was defined as being
"reached when all members of the group, including the leader, are
willing to accept a decision."' A member of management acted as
either leader (chairman) or resource (monitor), obliged to "keep the
meeting on track."' Furthermore, the judge also found that the employees in a particular unit or group considered the committee member from that group as their representative, and that their committee
participation was as a representative of the employees in their particular group or unit. The judge found that the effect of the committee structure was that the company dealt directly with the employees,
rather than with the union which represented them, when their member employees took safety complaints and suggestions to the committees." Thus, he found that the committees had become "a forum for

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id

at 29.
at 15.
at 13.
at 15.
at 18.
at 30-31.
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discussion and resolution" of problems and recommended the amount
and frequency of safety awards.
The judge did not find that the Safety Conference, held "to
formulate new ideas that would result in a high level of motivation
and commitment for improved safety performance," was a labor organization. 2 Employee participants were truly voluntary, advised not
to act as representatives and were permitted to make any suggestions
they wished. 3 The conference was not structured as a bilateral
mechanism to make specific proposals and respond to them.
The judge also found that these committee structures were implemented over the objections of the union.2' Although the union
requested in contract negotiations with the company that a joint labormanagement safety committee be developed and implemented, such
proposal was rejected by the company because the company continued
to resolve safety disputes directly with the committees. 5 This enabled the company to bypass the union, in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
The Board's majority affirmed the judge's opinion. However,
Member Raudabaugh and I attempted to spell out where the
employer's actions had gone amiss. Attempting to be instructive to
the labor-management community, we stated that many employeremployee cooperative activities did not, in our view, violate the
Act' 3 We distinguished between "collective bargaining" and the
term "dealing with" contained in the definition of labor organizations
in Section 2(5) of the Act and interpreted in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon
Co.Z

There, the Supreme Court found that the term "dealing with"
was broader than the term "collective bargaining." 8 We opined that
collective bargaining is a process by which two parties "compromise
their differences and arrive at an agreement" whereas "dealing with"
does not require that the two sides seek a compromise. 9 "Dealing
with," in our view, is merely a "bilateral mechanism" between two
parties where one makes a proposal and the other party responds by

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 1 n.6.
360 U.S. 203 (1959).
Id. at 211.
DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 2 (emphasis added).
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either making another proposal or rejecting the prior proposal, but
compromise is not required as it is in collective bargaining.' Acceptance or rejection may be, we noted, by word or deed. However,
there is a distinction between "dealing" and "no dealing.""' For example, brainstorming or developing ideas, suggestion boxes and similar programs are not illustrations of "dealing" since no proposals are
made but ideas merely generated; therefore, no response is expected242
ed."
Here we found the committee structure utilized by DuPont involved group, not individual, action communication.' The committees made proposals to management outside the committees as well as
inside the committees - such is inherent in the "consensus" system
and it made no difference whether they were made inside or outside
the committees.'
The majority also noted that it made little difference that there
were management representatives on the committee. 5 If the management representatives did not form a majority of the committee
membership and if the committee decision making authority was by
majority vote, then there would not be "dealing" within the committee .

In his concurrence, Member Devaney stressed the conclusion he
reached in Electromation, that the opportunities to develop these
employer-employee cooperative programs is much broader than has
been depicted by those in the labor-relations community who have
criticized the Board's Electromation decision. 7 He views the legislative history and precedent as leaving employers "significant freedom" to involve rank and file employees in matters which were formerly of management concern.'
Most agree that under the current state of the law the Board had
little choice in deciding these two cases. However, some argue that
the Board was too narrow in its approach and that it should have
interpreted the law to accommodate the present surge of cooperative
labor-management program activity in the workplace as lawful."9 In
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

244. Id. at 2-3.

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.

249.

Daniel Engeistein, Worker Participation Groups and Section 8(a)(2), in FUNDAMEN-
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fact, there is little to suggest that the law after Electromation and
DuPont is any different than it was before these two decisions were
rendered. Clearly those disappointed with the Board's unwillingness to
rewrite Section 8(a)(2) have, by their outspoken criticism of the
Board's decisions, tended to chill management's willingness to embark on cooperative labor or employee cooperative programs. The
management labor bar has done little to develop suggestions for implementing employee involvement programs consistent with current
law. Instead, legislative proposals have been introduced to correct
what some view as antiquated interpretations of Section 8(a)(2). Only
time will tell if any change will be adopted by Congress.
VI.

WORK ASSIGNMENTS VS. CHANGES IN UNIT DESCRIPTION

Extant law provides that when an employer makes contract proposals which change the scope of the bargaining unit, such proposals
are permissive subjects of bargaining only. Accordingly, if an employer insists upon obtaining such bargaining unit scope changes to
the point of impasse, then it commits an unfair labor practice in
violation of Section 8(a)(5). While the rule is relatively easy to
state, the Board has historically had difficulty in clearly defining and
applying the rule. Prior to the 1992 decisions in Antelope Valley
Press1 and Bremerton Sun Publishing Corp.' ' the Board utilized
an "either/or" test. Under that test, the Board was required to determine whether a company's proposal to change the contract was a
proposal to change the description of the unit or was instead a proposal to transfer work to non-unit employees.' 3 This is an important
question for employers and unions particularly in the printing industry
which is constantly confronted with changing technology.
In Antelope Valley, the employer presented the union with a
contract proposal which included the following demand in its reworked contract proposal:
Notwithstanding any other provision in this agreement, the Employer

TALS OF LABOR LAW UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

Acr 1993, at 73, 75-76 (PLI

Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-470, 1993).
250. Standard Register Co., 288 NJLR.B. 1409, 1410 (1988); Columbia Tribune Publishing Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 538, 551 (1973), enforced in reL part, 495 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1974).
251. 311 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (May 28, 1993).
252. 311 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (May 28, 1993).
253. Antelope Valley, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 50 at 3. See also Hill-Rom Co. v. NLRB, 957

F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1992); Idaho Statesman, 281 N.L.R.B. 272 (1986).
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reserves the right to assign the following work to persons outside
the bargaining unit:
1. Electronic markup of display and classified advertising matter;

2. Inputting of text and graphics into electronic systems for display and classified advertising matter; and

3. Electronic make-up of display and classified matter.
This language would be included under the company proposal in the
jurisdiction provision in the contract, in addition to the language in
the expiring contract which was to remain unchanged.' That present language provided that the employer recognize the union as the
representative of all employees covered by the agreement, and that
the "[]urisdiction of the Union ... begins with the markup of copy
and continues until the newspaper clears the folder and the gross
Urbanite Press." The unit, described in the expiring contract, consisted of "all employees performing any such work," and that provision was to remain unchanged in the employer's contract proposal.'
The union refused to accept the company proposal, and the
employer's final offer included the same language as was included in
its earlier proposal with the additional statement that no full-time
employee would be laid off as a result of the addition of new equipment from the date of contract signing until December 31, 1991. 8
The union continued to reject the company's proposal and impasse was reached. The company then implemented its proposal and
the language in question. 9 Thereafter, some former unit work was
performed by employees in another plant and other former bargaining
unit work was performed by employees in another department of the
plant.' No employee was laid off in the plant as a result of the
new equipment." 1 The union filed Section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charges alleging that the company failed to bargain in good faith
by implementing a change in the unit description.'
In Bremerton Sun, the circumstances were very similar except

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Antelope Valley, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 50 at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
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that the employer's contract proposal was somewhat different. In the
course of negotiating a contract due to expire in 1978, the company
had proposed the elimination of a section of the Recognition and
Jurisdiction Article of the expiring contract.' The section it proposed to be deleted specified that the jurisdiction of the union commences with "markup of copy and continues until the material is
ready for the printing press .. and the appropriate collective bargaining unit consists of all employees performing any such work."' "
In its place, the company proposed that a provision be inserted
which provided that the company could utilize new technology which
was being introduced into the newspaper industry.' The union in
those earlier 1978 negotiations rejected this proposal, but the parties
entered into a supplemental agreement which allowed the company to
utilize employees outside the bargaining unit to perform work on
some new technologically advanced, equipment.' Keyboarding, for
example, could be done by employees in the editorial department
during the process of editing wire service copy that was entirely
received by the company's computers.' These arrangements were to
become effective upon the installation of the specified new equipment.' If any disagreement or inconsistency between the supplemental and basic labor agreements existed, the supplemental agreement provided that the basic agreement was to prevail.' There was
also a provision providing lifetime employment until age seventy for
twenty-two of the unit employees.' 0 The parties continued to operate under this agreement until 1987."1
In its final offer during negotiations for a successor to its labor
agreement, the company proposed to change the contractual Recognition and Jurisdiction Article by deleting the statement that "the appropriate collective bargaining unit consists of all employees performing any such work"; to eliminate any reference to the supplemental
agreement; to include a statement that the employer, by the inclusion
of the new jurisdiction clause, does not intend to change either the
definition of the union's jurisdiction or the bargaining unit and that

263.

Bremerton Sun, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 51 at 1.

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267.
268.
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the company "reserves the right to determine how much of the work
within the jurisdiction of the Union is to be performed by bargaining
unit members"; and lastly, to reserve for itself the right to assign
work within the union's jurisdiction, particularly any work on new
equipment, to anyone including a non-employee m
The employer argued that the proposed language did not, and
was not, intended to modify the jurisdiction provision but was only
intended to incorporate what the parties had agreed upon in the supplemental agreement and that the proposal was intended to address
work assignments and not unit placement.' It stated that it would
recognize the union as the representative of employees to whom the
work was assigned upon a Board determination in a unit clarification
proceedingY4
The Board fashioned a new test mindful of the comments of
Judge Easterbrook in Hill-RomP7 in his references to attempting to
categorize these types of proposals as either changes in job assignment or changes in jurisdictionY6 He said "when the same facts can
be put in either category with equal plausibility, the distinction collapses .... Neither choice can be condemned as wrong, because in

rhetorical contests of this variety there is no right or wrong."'
Thus abandoning its either/or test of job assignment, the Board
determined that the question of legality would be made by first determining whether any change in unit description was proposedY8 If
none was requested, but the employer sought the right to transfer
work out of the unit, then the clause would be found lawful if there
was no evidence that the employer tried to deprive the union of the
right to include the people performing the work in the unitY9 The
latter would be available to the union in a unit clarification proceeding or in a refusal to bargain context.'
The Board then turned to the application of the test in Antelope
Valley and Bremerton Sun. In Antelope Valley it was found that the
employer's proposal was not an effort to change the unit description;

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Hill-Rom Co. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
Antelope Valley, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 50 at 38 n.7.
Hill-Rom, 957 F.2d at 460.
Bremerton Sun, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 51 at 4.
Id.
Antelope Valley, 311 N.L.I.B. No. 50 at 3.
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in fact, it continued the language of the prior contract."1 The Board
further found that the statement in the proposal under challenge, that
work could be assigned to "persons outside the bargaining unit," did
not mean that those persons could not be considered members of the
unit.' This question could be determined by a unit clarification petition, for instance. Thus, under the newly fashioned test, the Board
found no violation in Antelope Valley.2
In Bremerton Sun the Board did find a violation.' It found
that the company's proposal had eliminated the prior contractual unit
description by eliminating Section 1 of the prior agreement and that
the additional language expressing the intention not to modify the
definition of the bargaining unit was meaningless because in fact it
was the company's view that there was no unit description whatsoever in the agreement.' Thus, the Board held that by insisting upon
the deletion of the description of the bargaining unit in Article I,
Section 3, the company had improperly insisted to impasse on a
change in the bargaining unit - a permissive subject of bargaining.2
The application of the new Board test was clearly easier to apply
in Antelope Valley than in Bremerton Sun. The test's application was
significantly less clear in Bremerton Sun but still determinative. Certainly, the test was an effort to respond to the difficulty with the
either/or test which Judge Easterbrook had referred to in Hill-Rom.
Only time will tell whether it withstands the test of time and labor
lawyer contract-drafting ingenuity.
VII.

CONTRACT REPUDIATION AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE SIX MONTH 10(A) STATUTE

The question in A & L Underground' was whether, when an
employer totally repudiates a collective bargaining agreement, that
repudiation begins the running of the six month statute of limitations
period of Section 10(b),' so that a charge filed more than six

281. Id.
282. Id. at 3-4.
283. Id. at 4.
284. Bremerton Sun, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 51 at 5.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 302 N.L.RB. 467 (1991) (Chairman Stephens, Member Cracraft and myself formed
the majority. Member Devaney dissented.).
288. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
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months after the repudiation would be untimely.
The facts were as follows. On June 3, 1985, the company executed a collective bargaining agreement which included an "Interim
Agreement" which set forth certain changes and additions to the
parties' 1981-1984 collective bargaining agreement. 9 The Interim
Agreement stated that the company agreed to be bound by its terms
and that the company "would later, on completion of the printing of
the new agreement, execute a copy of it."2 ° The company, a construction employer, told the union that it believed the Interim Agreement it had signed applied only to a single project."' Some time
after it signed this Interim Agreement, the company decided "not to
sign another project agreement" and stopped complying with the
terms of the Interim Agreement.' In mid-July 1985, it received a
copy of the new collective bargaining agreement but did not sign it
and returned it to the union.' The union first learned of the
company's noncompliance in early 1986 and took no action to compel enforcement with the contract for most of that year.' The parties stipulated that the union had actual notice of the company's repudiation not later than December 4, 1986." On that date, the company notified the union by letter that it was repudiating the contract in
its entirety.20 Then, in August 1987, the union filed refusal to bargain charges against the company for failure to comply with the contract.?
Until A & L was decided, the leading case on whether a charge
was filed within the Section 10(b) period had been Al Bryant, Inc.
which espoused the continuing violation theory." Under this approach, when a complaint alleges that a respondent has violated the
Act by repudiating a collective bargaining agreement, the complaint is
not time-barred as long as a charge is filed during the term of the
agreement 2

289. A & L, 302 N.L.R.B. at 467.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 260 N.L.R.B. 128, 135 (1982), enforced, 711 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1983), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984).
299. A & L 302 N.LR.B. at 467 n.4.
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In A & L, the Board overruled Al Bryant. The Board reasoned
that the continuing violation theory undermines the important policy
goal underlying Section 10(b) by permitting dilatory conduct by the
injured party that impedes the stability of collective bargaining relationships and impairs the process for adjudicating charges.'
The Board further reasoned that the continuing violation theory
leaves the status of the entire agreement and the parties' obligations
under that agreement open for an extended period" It thus creates
a lengthy period of uncertainty as to the legal effect of the repudiated
agreement.M
The Board also found that the continuing violation theory permits the litigation of distant events. ° Since the Board should look
at the contract repudiation at the time of repudiation, this would
naturally become more difficult to analyze as time passes.'
Under A & L, once a party clearly repudiates a contract, the
Section 10(b) period starts to run and a charge must be filed within
six months of the date of repudiation for the charge to be timely.'
This rule is plainly grounded in the realities of industrial practices.
When one party unequivocally states that it will no longer be bound
by the contract in any way, the message is clear. The other side is on
notice that the contract will no longer be honored and if there is
some objection to that, a charge must be filed within six months of
the unequivocal statement of refusal to follow the contract in any respect.
VIII. THREATS TO PICKET AND 8(A)(7)(c)

In United Mine Workers, Local 2236 (Haoeld Dock & Transfer,
Inc.),' the question of whether a certifiable union violates Section
8(b)(7)(C)' by making a single, unretracted threat to picket for recognition was considered by the Board.
In September 1986, shortly after the company began operating a
coal storage facility, the respondent's organizer visited the facility and
300. Id. at 468.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 468-69.
305. Id. at 470.
306. 302 N.L.R.B. 441 (1991) (Chairman Stephens, Member Devaney and myself formed
the majority in this case. Member Cracraft dissented.).
307. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1988).
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spoke with the company's vice president.' The organizer told the
employer that he would like the employer "to be UMWA."' The
vice president responded that this was a decision for the employees to
make.1 One week later, the organizer contacted the company's vice
president and repeated his recognition request.3" When the vice
president replied that he was not interested and requested that the
organizer not come on to the company's property in the future, the
organizer concluded the conversation by stating that he had done all
he could to keep the pickets from shutting down the company and
that picketing would begin the following Monday.
While no
picketing occurred the threat to picket was never retracted.313
Section 8(b)(7)(C) incorporates the phrase "to picket or cause to
be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed. 31 4 Thus,
it is at least arguable that this section proscribes threats to picket to
the same extent it proscribes actual picketing. The Board here, however, construed Section 8(b)(7)(C) to mean that once picketing for a
recognitional or organizational purpose by a certifiable union has continued for a reasonable period (not to exceed thirty days) without a
petition being filed, any additional picketing or picketing threats will
violate the section.3"5
In construing the section in this manner, the Board looked to the
congressional purpose which was to limit "top down" and "blackmail"
organizing tactics through which unions use economic weapons to
force themselves on employees, regardless of employee wishes.31
The Board found nothing in the legislative history, however, that
indicated Congress wanted to limit the use of threats to a greater
extent than actual picketing. 7 Because Congress was willing to permit picketing for "a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty
days," the Board found it reasonable to infer that Congress must also
have been willing to permit a warning that such picketing could or
would happen. 8 Since, in this case, no picketing had preceded the
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threat to picket, the Board found no violation.319 Additionally, since
picketing had never been conducted in this case, a prerequisite to the
Board's finding that a later threat if unretracted for thirty days was a
violation, the Board found there to be no violation in this case.
Apart from the legislative history analysis, the Board's result
appears practical. Without picketing ever having occurred, can an
employer realistically feel coerced if there is a single threat to picket
and after thirty days, or some other reasonable period of time, there
still has not been any picketing?
IX. RIGHTS TO REVOKE DuEs

-

CHECK-OFF AUTHORIZATION

In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2088
(Lockheed Space Operations Co.),3" the charging party signed a
check-off authorization directing the employer to deduct from his
wages his "regular membership dues" owed to the union.321 The
authorization provided that it would be irrevocable for a one-year
period or until the expiration of the present collective bargaining
agreement.'s There was no requirement that the employee be a
member of the respondent union.3' During the irrevocability period,
the charging party sent a note to the union requesting that he be
dropped from union membership.' M He indicated in his note that he
had sent a notice to the Lockheed payroll department cancelling his
union dues check-off."z The union did not accept the letter as effecting a valid resignation and continued receiving membership dues
deducted from the charging party's wages."
In deciding that the union had violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and
2
the Board first considered the language of Section
(2),"
302(c)(4)."2 Section 302(c)(4) permits union membership dues deductions, "[p]rovided, that the employer has received from each employee, on whose account such deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 442.
302 N.L.R.B. 322 (1991).
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 322-23.
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 158(b)(2) (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1988).
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year, or beyond the termination date of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, whichever occurs sooner."3' The Board found
that the legislative history of this section and the section's language
were ambiguous.'l
The Board relied instead on the policy of "voluntary unionism"
that, as the Supreme Court explained in Pattern Makers,33 ' was incorporated into the Act by the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments."
The Board also relied upon the principle that a waiver of a statutory
right must be clear and unmistakable and noted that Section 7 of the
Act protects an employee who wishes to refrain from engaging in
union activity.333 Further, the Board noted that it will not lightly imply a waiver of Section 7 rights absent explicit language thereof."
The Board found that in this case no such waiver was present in the
check-off language, reasoning that the check-off language dealt generally with the method by which dues payments were to be made so
long as dues payments were properly owed." The Board did not
deal with the question of whether such dues payments were properly
owed after a person resigned his membership. 3' In essence, the
Board held that, absent explicit waiver language, when an employee
resigned his membership in the union he is absolved of any obligation to pay dues." 7
The result appears to comport to the reality of the workplace.
The average employee understands that he pays dues only for as long
as he is a union member and thus, he should not be expected to
parse the technical check-off language.
However in United Postal Service,38 another case reviewed upon remand from the Ninth Circuit,339 the Board interpreted the Postal
Reorganization Act of 1970 (hereinafter "PRA").' The Board had
originally found prior to appeal that where an employee resigned his

329. Id.

330. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 325.
331. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
332. Id. at 106.
333. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 327. See also Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460
U.S. 693 (1983).

334. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 327 n.18.
335. Id. at 328.
336. Id. at 329.
337. Id.
338. 302 N.L.R.B. 332 (1991).
339. 827 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1987).

340. Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970); Pub. L. No. 91-448, 84 Stat. 921 (1970)
(codified in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.).
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membership, his check-off authorization ceased. 3"
Section
1205(a)3' of the PRA contains different wording from the NLRA
with respect to the deduction of periodic dues. The PRA wording
provides that dues may be deducted if the Postal Service "has received from each employee, on whose account such deductions are
made, a written assignment which shall be irrevocable for a period of
not more than one year." 3 The Board found that, under the PRA,
some period of check-off irrevocability was required, while the words
of the NLRA allow for, but do not mandate, a period of irrevocability.'" Under this plain meaning, the PRA, according to the
Board, permits the employer to continue to check-off dues independent of union membership.'
The Board also observed that, unlike
the NLRA, Congress did not want postal employees to be bound by
any form of compulsory unionism.' Thus, while there was a broad
proscription against any form of union security arrangement, Congress
gave back to the unions some part of what they had lost in the union
security area when it provided for dues check-off irrevocability.
X.

OTHER DECISIONS

Irrespective of the method used to select cases in a review of
this type, there are those who may view my conclusion reached in
this discussion the result of the selection of the decisions analysized.
Therefore, to provide additional breadth, a brief mention of the following cases is also helpful.
In W. A. Krueger Co.,' 4l the Board found that an employer may
not unilaterally change wages, hours and working conditions prior to
the certification of the results of a decertification petition without violating Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.'
In Catalytic, Inc.,.' 9 the Board deferred to a contractual grievance settlement between the employer and the union prior to arbitration. The settlement was opposed by the grievant and a different
union which was neither the bargaining representative of the grievant

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

United Postal Service, 302 N.L.R.B. at 332.
39 U.S.C. § 1205(a) (1988).
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1988); United Postal Service, 302 N.L.R.B. at 334.
United Postal Service, 302 N.L.R.B. at 334.
Id.
299 N.L.R.B. 914 (1990).
Id. at 918.
301 N.L.R.B. 380 (1991).
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nor a party to the contract.5
In Solar Turbines, Inc.,3 1 the Board held that the employer had
permanently replaced striking employees, even though the replacements were required to satisfactorily pass a physical examination after
352
the strikers had applied for reinstatement.
In Stockton Roofing Co., 3 the Board found that a recently expired Section 8(f) contract was an adequate showing of interest to
process a representation petition.3
In Makro Inc. 5 and Oakwood Hospital,3 the Board found
state court jurisdiction was preempted when the General Counsel filed
an unfair labor practice complaint.' s
In Southwick Group,"8 the Board found that the merger of two
local unions was lawful since there was continuity of representation
and benefits? 9
In Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc.,
the Board overruled
Hutchison-Hayes International, Inc.,
and Westbrook Bowl,
to
the extent that they were inconsistent with Laidlaw. Laidlaw held that
an employer must show a loss of majority status by a preponderance
of the evidence rather than "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence,
a standard previously applied.
In Gitano Group, Inc.,' the Board overruled its spin-off theory
& " and found
of Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Buffalo
that the obligation of an employer to recognize a union at a new location will be
determined by the number of employees represented by the union at
the former location who were employed at the new location, and if
such constituted a majority of the employees at the new location,
recognition would be required at the new location.'

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 380.
302 N.L.R.B.
Id. at 15.
304 N.L.R.B.
Id.
305 N.L.R.B.
305 N.L.R.B.
Id.
306 N.L.R.B.
Id. at 1.
307 N.L.R.B.
264 N.L.R.B.
293 N.L.RB.
308 N.L.R.B.
299 N.L.R.B.
308 N.L.R.B.

14 (1991).
699 (1991).
663 (1991).
680 (1991).
1 (1992).
1211 (1992).
1300 (1982).
1000 (1989).
1172 (1992).
989 (1990).
at 1175 n.22.
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Finally, in Sunland Construction Co.' and Town & Country
Electric, Inc., the Board ruled that an employer violates the Act
when it refuses to hire fully qualified applicants who are announced
paid union organizers who would continue their organizational activities while employed by the company.'

XI. A SUMMARY OF THE BUSH BOARD
After the above review and a study of the cases decided by the
Bush Board has been made, is there any common stream that can be
perceived? Was it administratively efficient? Was the Bush Board
pro-management, or pro-labor? Did it protect the rights of employees
and their individual desires? Was it proactive, or did its decisions reflect constraints?
A.

Administrative Effectiveness

Commencing with a review of the Board's record of case issuance, it is clear that the Board did make an effort to reduce the number of old cases which clearly should have been decided by previous
Boards. Its reduction in cases over five and two years old, from the
earlier high of sixty unfair labor practice cases and six representation
cases, to nine unfair labor practice cases and one representation case,
is noteworthy.' It clearly indicates a commitment to efficiency and
industry as most of these aged cases contained difficult factual situations with thorny issues. It also evidences a sensitivity to congressional and judicial concern.'
On the other hand, the Bush Board was blessed with no turnover
during the 1990-1993 period except for the loss of Member Cracraft
in 1992, reducing the Board to four members. However, even operating one member below normal strength, the Board continued to reduce its aged case backlog. It was not afflicted with the time delaying need to reassign cases to a newly appointed Board Member, or a
review and restudy of proposed decisions as would have been the
case had it been necessary to construct new three-member panels to

366. 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 (Dec. 16, 1992).
367. 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 (Dec. 16, 1992).
368. Sunland, 309 N.L.PB. No. 180 at 1; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 3.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
370. See General Accounting Office Urges N.LRB. to Set Time Targets For All Decisions, 28 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1240 (1990).
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accommodate a new Board member. Since there was no appointment
made by the President to replace Member Cracraft, the four members
learned each other's views on various subjects and were able to expedite the decision-making process. Thus, for whatever combination of
reasons, the Board's record of case production and backlog reduction
should be commended.
Some argue that even having nine unfair labor practice complaint
cases and one representation case over two years old is inexcusable
and indicates inefficiency of substantial proportion. I would agree that
the Board should not have any cases which are over one year old
except in the rarest of circumstances. In the main, the Bush Board
should be given more than a passing grade on its case production
during its term.
B. Decisional Record
Irrespective of the Bush Board's decisions which one selects to
evaluate, a number of conclusions can be reached. Initially, it seems
clear that the Board's decisions resulted in a number of instructive
rules which advised the parties how to govern their future actions.
Still, direction was provided by some decisions. For example, in
Willamette371 and Dubuque,3' labor and management were instructed when and how to fulfill their obligation to bargain; 7 in
Sunland 4 and Town & Country,37 employers were advised of unlawful hiring procedures; in Makro376 and Oakwood,3" parties were
notified when continued processing of state court litigation would
379
constitute an additional violation of the Act;378 and in Gitano,
di-

rection was given on how an employer should determine whether it
has an obligation to bargain with an old union."
Secondly, it seems that the Bush Board acted in more of a judicial than legislative capacity for it followed established case law and
distinguished prior decisions. In Electromation.. and DuPont" it
371.
372.

Riedel Int'l (Willamette Tug & Barge Co.), 300 N.L.R.B. 282 (1990).
Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991).

373. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94, 117-20, 138-44.
374. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 (Dec. 16, 1992).
375.

Town & Country Elec. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 (Dec. 16, 1992).

376. Makro Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 663 (1991).
377. Oakwood Hosp., 305 N.L.R.B. 680 (1991).
378.
379.

See supra text accompanying notes 355-57.
Gitano Group, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1992).

380. See supra text accompanying notes 363-65.
381.

Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
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resisted the temptation to rewrite the law (or to redefine the parameters of previous decisions as some suggested it should)." In
Sunland" and Town & Country,3" it followed long established
legal principles even though the tactics the unions adopted were repugnant to some.3 The Bush Board could not be viewed as pro-active, but rather as one that performed its duties consistent with the
standards of judicial constraint, irrespective of whether its members
were always comfortable with a given decision.
Thirdly, its decisions attempted to speak to the realities of time
and the workplace. Willamette, the case which overruled Walter
Pape,3" provided a more appropriate standard which addressed the
practicalities of modem purchase and sale negotiations.Y In
Stockton,"9 the Board found a realistic solution to the showing of
interest question presented by Section 8(f) contract situations by finding that the expired Section 8(f) contract provided a showing of interest sufficient to support a Section 9 representation petition.39 While
the Board could have embarked on a circuitous road to find other
evidence of employee interest, it instead adopted a simple, straightforward rule providing that the expired contract was sufficient.
Lastly, regardless of the method one uses when selecting Bush
Board cases to examine (by topic, by section of the Act considered,
by date of issuance or union involved, etc.), it is impossible to conclude that the decisions of the Bush Board favored the employer over
the union or vice versa. In sum, while members of the labor-management community, including Board members, may have differences of
opinion as to the result in a given case, most, if not all, will agree
that members of the Bush Board "called 'em as they saw 'em."
It cannot be persuasively argued that the Bush Board's decisions
created giant deviations in the law under the Act. Although it obviously made interpretive refinements, it deferred, as it should have
under our constitutional system, any major changes or corrections in
direction of the law to the Congress. If this Bush Board leaves any

382. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (July 15, 1993).

383. See supra text accompanying notes 200-05, 236-49.
384. 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 (Dec. 16, 1992).
385. 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 (Dec. 16, 1992).

386. See supra text accompanying notes 366-68.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Riedel Int'l (Willamette Tug & Barge Co.), 300 N.L.R.B. 282 (1990).
205 N.L.R.B. 719 (1973).
See supra text accompanying notes 117-20, 138-44.
Stockton Roofing Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 699 (1991).
See supra text accompanying notes 353-54.
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message to history it will be that, though it was sorely tempted to
make or rewrite the law, it is the Board's obligation to only interpret
the law and to be mindful of workplace reality and the practical
ramifications of its decisions as it exercises its statutory obligations.
Therefore, the Bush Board should receive "good marks" on the manner in which it fulfilled its decisional obligations.
XII.

CONCLUSION

A More Efficient Playing Field is Needed
The purpose of this discussion has been not to critique or commend the Bush Board but rather to attempt to evaluate the efficacy of
the present rhetoric from some academics, union leaders, and even
some in the current administration, that America needs to level the
playing field between management and labor.
With the percentage of unionized employees in America currently
lower than at any time in recent history and with the economy still
floundering, concededly, we all seem to wonder if there is not a
better way to operate and compete amongst ourselves and with our
foreign competitors. However, there is little proof to date that a
change in the labor law will allow us to compete more effectively.
There are those who claim that one of the reasons for the malaise in our economy is that the Act is outdated and antiquated. They
claim the Act does not accommodate the needs of the workplace,
exemplified in cooperative labor-management programs as they exist
today, new forms of employment (i.e., leased employees and the like)
and other recent employment practices prevalent in the workplace of
the 1990's.
These critics conclude that the only solution is a wholesale
amendment to the Act by instituting such changes as:
* Arbitration of the terms of a first contract when the parties cannot
reach an agreement.
* Employer recognition of a union to represent all of the employer's
employees in a unit, if 55-60% of those employees sign cards proffered by the union, authorizing the union to represent them.
- Employer recognition of minority unions.
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- Strengthening the right of associations so employer property rights
would become subservient to those association rights.
- Eliminate management prerogatives.'

However, the adoption of changes such as those suggested by Professor William Gould would not be amendments to the current law; it
would result in a reconstruction of the statute. Essentially, it would
require a new law, with new parameters and new doctrines, which
would burden the economy and the labor-management community
with new concepts. These new legal concepts and requirements would
probably spawn additional litigation aimed at testing the legality of
the new statutory concepts.
If the labor-management community had just experienced a
Board that was decidedly impartial, toward either management or
labor, or one that revised the current body of workplace law, there
might be a justification for such a drastic change in the law. But,
until those proposing these changes in the law can document the need
for such drastic legislative reform, for reasons other than the unions'
inability to organize a greater number of new employees, Congress
should not seriously consider the suggested changes of the Act. Our
energies as a nation, in both Congress and the workplace, should be
aimed at solving the problems of crime, unemployment, foreign competition, racial tension and respect and not at changing the law so
that another special interest group can prosper.
However, there is no question that our energies should be directed to developing a more efficient decisional process, a process
that attempts to curtail, not generate, litigation. In this regard, if labor
and management are truly anxious to improve the manner in which
we resolve disputes, the following are but a few suggestions of action
that could increase decisional efficiency:
- Reconstruct the manner in which Board Orders are enforced.
Change the present procedure by providing that Board Orders would
be self-enforcing sixty days after issuance unless a party files a
notice of appeal and processes such an appeal. This would eliminate
the need for the Board to seek enforcement in most cases.

392.

WILLjIA

B. GOULD, IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FurTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RE-

LATIONSHUS AND THE LAW (M.IT. Press 1993).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

49

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. lhl1

- Adopt an amendment to the law which provides that a Certification of Representative after an election shall be a final decision and
shall also contain an Order that the certified representative and the
employer be required to commence bargaining unless an appeal of
the election process is filed within thirty days from the Board's
dismissal of the objections or its decision concerning them.
* Amend the Act so that Board lawyers need not take time, while
preparing decisions, to read the entire transcript in a given proceeding, but rather empower the Board to hire other personnel, such as
para-professionals, to read and digest transcripts of testimony as is
the practice elsewhere.
* Change the statute to provide that any Board member who does
not act on a decision for three weeks after the majority has voted
on the case shall be instructed that the decision will issue within
one week with his or her dissent noted. Thereupon, the decision
would be issued without dissenting opinion.
I suggest that the aim should be to improve the manner in which the
National Labor Relations Board administers and delivers its decisions
to the workplace parties, not to change the law. By further expediting
the delivery of decisions to the parties, the Act will become more
relevant to the issues with which the parties are confronted, and thus,
in this writer's view, make the field more playable.
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